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NOTES AND COMMENT
Statute against Perpetuities aims to remedy, and they are not included
under it.27 But the grantors of these fees have been practically
subject to penalties for so fettering estates. Their rights of re-entry
have been held extinguished by a conveyance therof by deed to a
third person before entry for breach of condition, even though such
conveyance be to a son of the grantor who, upon his death becomes
his heir.28  Such holding was on the ground that the father thereafter
could make no entry or claim as he had no interest; neither could
the son as he was a stranger to the condition.
It is not socially expedient that property be fettered. Besides,
the prayer of the grantee is appealing. The Trustees in the instant
case may be unable, for example, to carry on financially the burden
of church work. They may sell their property,29 but its title is not
unembarrassed nor unhampered as long as it can be used only for a
particular purpose. No one would say that it is. This is disadvan-
tageous and until, by legislative enactment, estates which tie up prop-
erty in this manner are abolished, the rights of the parties, when they
are to a degree difficult to determine, may probably in the last analysis
be best determined by what is socially beneficial, making for certainty
of title, unhampered use of property, quieting of estates and greater
marketability. This has been the evident policy of the law.
"'After all, the question whether a given opinion is a danger to
society is a question of the times, and is a question of fact.' The
truth is that a changing sense of the exactions of utility and justice
has evoked a changing law." 30
G. .B.
EXEMPTION OF COMPENSATION AwARDs FRom EXECUTION.-
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of Surace v.
Danna,1 is an interesting example of the liberal construction the
courts are disposed to give to the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law. The precise point involved presents a question
vitally affecting the value of the award; and one which follows the
granting of every award in such logical sequence, that it is surprising
that it has not been presented for judicial determination before now.
The defendant had an award of $3,500. made in a lump sum, under
the Workmen's Compensation Law,2 for injuries sustained in the
"'30 Cyc. 1474.
' Rice v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 12 Allen (Mass.) 141 (1866) ; Hooper
v. Cummings, 45 Me. 359 (1858).
Pettit v. Stuttgart, supra.
Cardozo, "Paradoxes of Legal Science," at p. 24, citing Bowman v. The
Secular Society.
1248 N. Y. 18, 161 N. B. 315 (1928).
'N. Y. Cons. Laws, Ch. 67.
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course of his employment. He deposited this money in a bank.
Subsequently the plaintiff obtained a judgment against him and
execution was returned unsatisfied. Supplementary proceedings fol-
lowed, and upon the disclosure that there was a balance of the award
in the sum of $2,600. still on deposit in the bank to the credit of the
defendant, the County Court issued an order directing the bank to
pay to the sheriff a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment. The
defendant appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the order,
with permission to proceed to the Court of Appeals. The defense
interposed, is that the* money being compensation comes within
the immunity granted by the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law.3 The plaintiff argued that the word "due" as
used in that section limits the exemption to compensation owing and
unpaid.4 It was held that the money paid to the injured workman
under the Workmen's Compensation Law represented a fund for his
maintenance during the continuance of disability and as such, a
balance thereof, on deposit to his credit is exempt from execution.
A dissenting opinion, written by ,Judge O'Brien, advocates strict
construction of the statute upon the theory that it is the duty of the
courts to interpret the law as they find it and as theiquestion whether
one shall receive the privilege of escaping payment of a debt is one of
policy, it is essentially one for the Legislature.
Unquestionably statutes are to be given the construction that
will effectuate the legislative intention but adherence to the letter will
not be suffered to "defeat the general purpose and manifest policy
intended to be promoted" by their adoption.5 The Workmen's Com-
pensation Law was enacted to provide for the injured workman at a
time when through misfortune he is unable to support himself.6
He is to receive the benefits provided even if his injury is the result
of his contributory negligence, and in spite of the fact that he may
have assumed the risk. The payment he receives is designed to sup-
port him during disability, and thus prevent him from becoming a
derelict.7 The cost of his maintenance becomes a charge upon the
industry without regard to fault. He is expressly prohibited from
waiving the benefits conferred upon him by this act, by a provision
of the section in question. The legislative intention is apparent. It
'Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 33. "Compensation or benefits due
under this chapter shall not be assigned, released or commuted except as
provided by this chapter and shall be exempt from all claims of creditors, and
from levy, execution and attachment or other remedy for the recovery or collec-
tion of a debt, which exemption may not be wgived."
'Bull v. Case, 165 N. Y. 578, 59 N. E. 301 (1901) ; Baker v. Buntnall, 52
Barb. (N. Y.) 188 (1868).
'Spencer v. Myers, 150 N. Y. 269, 44 N. E. 942 (1891); The People v.
Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54 (1892) ; People ex. rel. Wood v. Lacombe,
99 N. Y. 43, 1 N. E. 599 (1885); Matter of Folsom, 56 N. Y. 60 (1874).
'Matter of Post v. Burger & Gahlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916);
N. Y. C. R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 197 (1916).
" Post v. Burgher, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916).
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does not merely give him a right to these benefits, but goes farther,
and protects him against his own folly and the demands of unscrupu-
lous employers that he sacrifice this right as a condition precedent to
obtaining employment. The conclusion that the Legislature recog-
nized the fact that the injured workman was in a much more trying
position than his brother in a trade possessed of sound health and
ability to work at a small salary, or even if he be unemployed, is
inescapable.
It should be noted that defendant's case is not one of the class
expressly exempt from attachment by the terms of the Civil Practice
Act. Section 777 provides that the earnings of a judgment debtor
for his personal services rendered are exempt from seizure when it
is made to appear by his oath or otherwise that the earnings are
necessary for the use of a family wholly or partly supported by his
labor.8  Another section permits execution for 10% of accruing
wages, but even then, if the wages are less than $12. per week they
are exempt.9 As compensation under the law is neither accruing
wages nor earnings for personal services, it does not come within the
immunity granted by the foregoing sections.
To sustain the contention of the plaintiff in the present case,
would be to hold that it was the intention of the Legislature to secure
the payment of compensation to the injured workman, because of his
great need of protection and support, and then to deny him the pro-
tection afforded to workmen in good health, and actually employed.
"The thought behind the phrase proclaims itself misread, when the
outcome is injustice or absurdity." 10 To hold with the plaintiff
would be to utterly defeat the purpose of the act in cases where the
injured workman was not only penniless but in debt, and therefore
in greatest need, being unable to purchase necessaries on credit. For
a debtor need only secure an order in supplementary proceedings
containing the usual restraining clause (forbidding transfer, assign-
ment, etc.) and this will tie up the payments as they become due, and
the entire amount may be appropriated in payment of the debt.
In the case of Yates County National Bank v. Carpenter 1 in
construing a similar statute, 12 the Court of Appeals said: "It is quite
" C. P. A., Sec. 777: "This article does not authorize the seizure of * * *
the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services * * * when it is
made to appear by his oath * * * that those earnings are necessary for the use
of a family * * * supported by his labor."
"C. P. A., Sec. 684: "Where * * * judgment recovered *** and execution
•* * returned * * * unsatisfied, and where * * * wages * * are due * * *
judgment debtor * * * to amount of twelve dollars or more per week, * * *
the court * * * must issue ** * execution * * * against the wages * * *."
10 Matter of Meyer, 209 N. Y. 386, 103 N. E. 713 (1913) ; Smith v. People,
47 N. Y. 330 (1872).
119 N. Y. 550, 23 N. E. 1108 (1890).
C. P. A., Sec. 667: "The pay of a non-commissioned officer * * * or
private in the military or naval service of the United States or the State of
New York, *** a pension or other reward * * * are also exempt from levy
and sale * * *"
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obvious, that such an exception can produce no beneficial result unless
it is extended beyond the letter of the act and given life and force
according to its evident spirit and meaning." 13 In that case, the
defendant was the recipient of a military service pension, which was
exempt from execution. 14 The plaintiff there, as in the case at bar
contended that the exemption extended only to the pension moneys
before payment by the government, but the Court held that the
pension moneys received by the defendant were exempt, and that
such exemption extended to a house and lot in which the pension
money was invested.
In another case, 15 defendant, a civil war veteran, upon receipt of
his pension money from the United States Government, deposited it
in a Savings Bank. A representative action was brought by a
receiver to recover the fund and hold it for the benefit of creditors.
The Court of Appeals in denying the claim said 16 that "it would be
clearly unreasonable to hold that the quality of exemption was lost
by what was only a careful mode of preserving the money."
Adherence to the rule of strict construction is not without its
support in the authorities,' 7 and the evils of too liberal interpretation
and so-called judicial legislation cannot be overstressed, but to destroy
the efforts of the Legislature which, prompted by a sound public
policy, has attempted to correct a great evil, because of their unhappy
choice of a word or phrase, should not be tolerated, unless any other
course would require too wide 9, departure from the apparent
meaning.
While Section 33 standing alone would seem to express a more
limited immunity, a reading of the entire statute, with regard to the
purpose for which it was enacted, justifies the construction the Court
has placed upon it. The word "due" though commonly used to mean
owing and unpaid, may also mean, paid, but paid because due, i. e.,
required: demanded. Words have a meaning that can vary accord-
ing to the manner in which they are used.'8  The rule of construc-
tion governing these statutes, as expressed in the words of Chief
Judge Cardozo writing the majority opinion in this case, is, "The
end to be served, and the mischief to be averted supply the clues and
the keys by which construction is to be governed." The decision is
further evidence of the desire to continue the liberal attitude adopted
by the Court of Appeals of this State in the first case involving the
Workmen's Compensation Law to come before it.19
S. J. T.
Supra, note 11.
14 Supra, note 12.
Stockwell v. National Bank of Malone, 36 Hun. 583 (3rd Dept. 1885).
16 Ibid., 585.
17Supra, note 4 and McIntosh v. Aubrey, 185 U. S. 122 (1901); Smith
v. Blood, 106 App. Div. 317, 324, 94 N. Y. S. 667 (3rd Dept. 1905).
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418 (1917) ; Int. Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty,
272 U. S. 50 (1926).19Matter of Petrie, 215 N. Y. 335, 109 N. E. 549 (1915).
